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In this study it is argued that Black Economic Empowerment is very important as a way of creating stable 
socio - economic stability in South Africa. We note that we are now at the stage where both the government 
and corporate South Africa have accepted that BEE is an economic imperative. This has resulted in policy 
adoption by the government and the private sector driven Sector Charters. Agreeing that 25% of the 
economy should be in black hands by 2014. 
It is argued in this research that reliance of BEE investors on debt funding, creates serious doubts about the 
attainability of this objective. We also argue that as far as reliance on very high leveraged structures, BEE is 
similar to leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and management buyouts (MBOs). However, we noted out that most of 
the characteristics which make LBOs successful are absent in BEE transactions, a factor which increases the 
probability of failure rate. It has been proven that after MBOs, companies perform better, resulting in double 
digit returns to investors. This is difficult in BEE transactions because little changes as far as management and 










We investigated some popular funding structures that have been used in BEE funding. We use these 
structures to determine what is likely to come out of them. The unsettling truth is that all our research shows 
that the Net Equity Value that will vest with BEE investors at the maturity of these structures is far below the 
25% policy objective. Case studies of ABSA and Metropolitan empowerment structures, which happened in a 
period of abnormally high equity returns, confirm our suspicion that it will be unlikely to achieve the 
government objective of 25% BEE ownership in the long term. If South Africa wishes to ensure future 
political, economic and social stability, we need to revisit these BEE funding structures and ensure that the 
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South Africa is in the process of economic transformation to correct economic deprivation visited upon black 
South Africans by successive apartheid laws and government. The policy which has been adopted by 
government to deal with this historical imperative is called Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment, which 
will henceforth be referred to as BEE. This policy attempts to correct the skewed distribution of income, 
wealth and skills and also aims to specifically ensure that black people are the owners of capital and control a 
meaningful share of the South African economy. In pursuance of this policy state owned enterprises and 
private business are encouraged to sell parts of their businesses to black people. 
The government promulgated the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act No. 53 of 2003 and this 
lead to the strategy paper issued by the Department of Trade and Industry (Dll) in 2003 on economic 
transformation in South Africa and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (Dll, 2003) 
BEE is defined by the Department of Trade and Industry (Dll) as, "an integrated and coherent socio-
economic process that directly contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about 
significant increases in the number of black people that manage, own and control the country's economy, as 
well as significant decreases in income inequalities',(Government of South Africa, 2003:9). This strategy is 
expanded upon in the Dll's Codes of Good Practice on Black Economic Empowerment which were finally 
gazetted by government on 9 February 2007 (Government of South Africa, 2007). The Codes of Good Practice 
includes a detailed scorecard giving details of the components of the BEE strategy and their weighting in 
measuring Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment. 
The elements of the Codes and the generic scorecard are ownership, employment equity, skills development, 
preferential procurement, socio-economic and enterprise development. These elements are set out in Code 
Series 000 to 800. The scorecard is aimed at encouraging and rewarding those companies which are 
supporting BEE to access business opportunities, especially from government, state owned enterprises and 
private sector companies who do business with government. Also, different sectors of the economy have 
voluntarily adopted sector charters which guide businesses in those sectors into implementing BEE policy. For 
instance there is the financial services charter and, mining charter. 
This study will only be concerned with the equity ownership element which is set out in the code, 
Measurement of the Ownership Element of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (Code 100) of the 
generic scorecard. Vuyo Jack, CEO of Empowerdex, an independent economic empowerment rating agency, 
states that "the objective of the ownership element is to increase the number of Black people who own, 










The ownership element is given a weighting of 20% by the government in the BEE scorecard. The 
government, through BEE policy, has set itself the task of transferring at least 25% of the economy to black 
hands over the next 10 years. Kingston, the then CEO of Deutsche Bank in South Africa, aptly summarizes 
this when he states, "The principles under/ying BEE in South Africa are simple: transfer approximately 25% of 
the economy's wealth to black shareholders through the sale of equity or assets wIthin a specified timeframe', 
(Kingston and Chiume 2006: 25). It is interesting to note that Deutsche Bank estimates that approximately 
R1.3 trillion will be needed to finance empowerment transactions if the 25% target of wealth transfer is to be 
achieved. The objective of this study is to study current BEE funding structures to determine whether this 
objective is attainable. 
It becomes critically important to ensure that the deals that are entered into today are structured in a way 
which will assist in this process. Thus the Net Equity Value in a company which will be transferred to the 
intended BEE beneficiaries should be clearly understood upfront. Otherwise the country may find itself, come 
2014, having again to embark on a second round of empowerment deals because the current wave of 
empowerment transactions would have failed to yield the desired results. Further, the failure to meet these 
targets of black ownership of the economy may have political ramifications and create a backlash against 
current ownership structures. 
The importance of Net Equity Value is recognised in the Codes. It is seen as ensuring the real transfer of 
wealth as it constitutes 7 points of the 20 points of the ownership element. A company will earn the full 7 
points when the black participants have been released from all third-party rights arising from the financing of 
the transactions or if all black participants in the company have never been subject to any such third-party 
rights. 
An objective of this study is to critically analyse current BEE financing structures in relation to achieving a 
25% share for black participants over the longer term as well as comparing the expected realisation of equity 
ownership to the equity ownership that is likely to occur given likely equity returns over the longer term. For 
example, in the banking sector, a company may indicate that 10% of its equity has been sold to a BEE entity. 
Yet, over a period of 10 years, what is the expected net value or net equity ownership to be achieved given 
the requirements of any financing transaction? Is a stated 10% transfer of ownership expected to be realised 
over a period of 10 years or will there be dilution of equity ownership due to the terms of the transaction? 
Further, how does this relate to the government's target that 25% of the South African economy should be 
under black ownership within a period of 10 years? 
The focus of this study will be on the Net Equity Value which must be transferred to black participants, hence 
the focus on the funding structures. Yet the study endeavors to pierce the veil of BEE structures to analyze 
whether the target ownership rates are likely to be achieved within a realistic timetable. Due to the lack of 
access to capital resources, BEE transactions are subject to high levels of financial leverage. In this respect, 
BEE transactions reflect leveraged buyout transactions and this study will evaluate the similarities and 










The objective is to evaluate whether the transfer of equity ownership achieved in an LBO may offer insights 
about the structuring of BEE transactions. Private equity transactions may also involve high levels of financial 
leverage and aspects of private equity funding may be comparable to BEE funding structures. 
1.2. Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Net equity ownership by BEE companies is critical if RSA is to achieve its objective of transferring 25% of the 
economy into black hands by 2015. There are many factors which may either enhance or hinder this process. 
However, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of the funding structure on net equity 
ownership and to evaluate the impact of interest rates and changes in interest rates and dividend streams on 
the final net equity ownership after the stipulated period. In terms of the Sector Charters and BEE Codes, it is 
expected that BEE ownership in sectors should be at stated levels within stated periods. Although, currently 
BEE transactions are stated to be at certain levels, effective BEE ownership over a period of 10 years may 
differ due to the funding structure(s) used in a BEE transaction. For example, the Financial Sector Charter 
indicates that BEE ownership in the financial sector should be at 25% black ownership by 2010. "A minimum 
of 10% of the target " .. Must be satisfied by way of direct ownership by black people ... /1 (Government of 
South Africa, Financial Sector Charter, 2007: 14). 
However, the consequences of the funding structures used to finance the BEE transactions may result in 
effective BEE ownership that may be significantly less than the stated (nominal) ownership level required in 
terms of the sector charters. 
A major challenge of BEE transactions has been the fact that black buyers do not have capital to buy these 
assets or businesses. This has led to the reliance on debt to fund these transactions. Therefore, in most cases 
these businesses will be found to be highly leveraged and geared either directly or indirectly. Needless to 
say, movements in interest rates may have a marked impact on these transactions. In this study we shall 
analyse BEE transactions and compare them to corporate restructurings found in leveraged buy-outs and in 
private equity transactions. In this regard the following will be undertaken:-
o Analysis of BEE transactions in relation to stated ownership targets. 
o Analysis of the probable effects of BEE funding structures on equity ownership and equity dilution 
taking into account interest and dividend flows and equity returns over the longer term. 
o Analysis of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and Private Equity investing. 
o Investigation of critical success factors of LBOs and a comparative analysis to indicate in which ways 
are BEE transactions similar and in which ways do they differ from LBOs. 
The rationale behind these studies is premised on the fact that both LBOs and BEE transactions rely very 











To further elucidate the BEE funding phenomenon, in particular to look into effective BEE ownership after the 
expiry of the stated period, we shall attempt to answer the following questions:-
o VVhat are the funding structures common to BEE transactions? 
o What are the required ownership levels in the sector charters? 
o What is the level of stated (nominal) equity ownership indicated by the BEE transactions evaluated in 
this study? 
~ What is the effective BEE ownership expected from the transactions based on expected ordinary 
dividend growth rates, interest/preference dividend costs and the expected share price performance 
over a stated period? 
o What is the range of effective ownership to be achieved if we analyse changes in the expected 
dividend rate and equity prices and changes in interest rates? 
In order to answer these questions, we will firstly use an example of a typical structure and calculate the 
probable difference between the stated and probable BEE equity ownership over a 5year or 10-year period. 
Then we will use selected case studies of actual BEE transactions to evaluate whether the stated transfer of 
equity ownership is likely over a period of 10 years. 
After a period of falling interest rates, South Africa has experienced a significant increase in interest rates 
since 2005. As discussed above, BEE transactions are mainly funded by debt or debt equivalents such as 
preference share financing. The nature of debt funding involves contractual commitments to pay interest and 
capital. In terms of preference share financing, there is a commitment to pay a fixed dividend to the 
financiers prior to any payment of ordinary dividends to black participants. However, any deficits between 
the ordinary dividend and required financing costs as measured by interest costs or preference share 
dividends may be rolled up if the contract with the vendor so permits; otherwise additional financing is 
required to be arranged to finance any shortfalls. Despite the prospects of higher returns, this exposes the 
company to financial risk, both interest and capital risk. 
We shall further investigate what the impact of interest rate changes on effective BEE ownership is expected 
to be, given the current financing structures used to fund BEE transactions? In answering this question we 
need to answer the following questions:-
o What are the funding structures? 
o What are the interest rates or preference dividend rates charged to BEE structures over time, 










This study hopes to answer all these questions. This will help BEE practitioners and white companies who are 
considering undertaking BEE transactions. It will also assist government to understand the outcome of these 
BEE transactions at the specified future date. What is important here is for BEE companies to know what to 
expect when their structures mature. Also, government should know whether its policy objectives will have a 
high probability of being achieved over time. 
1.3. Limitations 
The Final Codes on Black Economic Empowerment were enacted only in February 2007, and whilst the topic is 
highly topical, the fact is that there are very limited peer-reviewed publications on the topic of Black Economic 
Empowerment financing structures. The topic is highly specific and access to the contracts of BEE financing 
structures is restricted. Although this places constraints on the ambit of the study and limits the literature 
review, the study makes a meaningful contribution to the understanding of BEE financing structures and their 
likely impact on net equity ownership of black participants in such BEE transactions. 
1.4. Case study research 
The methodology that will be used in this investigation is the case study methodology. It is critical to briefly 
discuss this methodology in order to understand what it is. Also, we shall investigate what it can achieve and 
the conditions under which it is most appropriate to use. We shall in the same vein look at its strengths and 
weaknesses so that we can appreciate the robustness of whatever conclusions we reach. 
Yin defines a case study as, " an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomena within its 
real - life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident, 
(1994:13). Stake says, "Case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to 
understand its activity within important circumstances, (199S:xi). 
It is also very important to realize that case study cannot just be used under all circumstances. There are 
situations which lend themselves to this type of research. Other methods like regression analysis and 
economic models may be suitable for other types of research. What is critical about case study research is 
that it provides insights from what has been observed from experience from a particular occurrence. This is 
different from generalization which other forms of research are most appropriate. 
Tellis, maintains that "selecting case study must be done to maximize what can be learned, in the period of 
time available for the study", he further says, "case studies tend to be selective, focusing on one or two 












The choice of case study 
Briefly it is important to investigate the appropriateness of the case study methodology in our 
research. Steve Curry mentions instances where this approach should be used. We must 
therefore test our research topic to see whether it satisfies these conditions. He argues that the 
case study should inform about the actual events or poliCies, (1993: 4). In our research we are 
looking at the policy decision of Black Economic Empowerment on particular cases in a specific 
period. We therefore satisfy this requirement. 
It is further argued that, "a case study will be oriented to actual problems or decisions, depicting 
the way in which they were approached, and opening up the possibility of improved 
approaches." (1993:4). In our research we are looking at the funding structures and we would 
like to see whether policy objectives are attainable. We shall take a different route if we find out 
that the current approach is inappropriate. Again our proposed research satisfies this 
requirement. 
In countries where there are major policy changes case studies may give more insight into 
economic events. Also, in instances where that particular economic event is influenced by policy 
changes of government. Again in this research we are particularly looking at the consequence of 
this government policy directive, and its consequence. It can be safely concluded that our chosen 
research methodology is appropriate for this type of research, and it will be able to provide 
answers to our research problem statements. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Case Study Research Methodology 
Case study is not different from other research methodologies. It also has its strengths and 
weaknesses. It is thus important for a researcher to appreciate these upfront so as to mitigate 
the weaknesses and exploit the strengths. Naidex 2009, page 2 in "How to do Case Study 






Can provide insight into issues that may need to be explored in great depth. 
Enables a depth of understanding. 
Enables in-depth probing into the case, which helps to develop a descriptive picture 
or, depending on the nature of the research, facilitates explanations and predictions. 
The researcher considers a real event. 
The researcher is more likely to become aware of important factors that did not 












Uncovers detail in complicated situations. 
Uses few resources. 
Is relatively inexpensive 
As mentioned above, every research methodology has its own weaknesses. Naidex in the same 




The study may become merely an extended anecdote, without evaluative relevance. 
It may be biased, as a result of the researcher becoming too involved in the 
collection and analysis of data. 
Case studies - particularly single case design - are not general, so they cannot 
represent a population 
Understanding these strengths and characteristics is critically important for a researcher so that 
he takes an extra effort and be particularly cautious about conclusions that can be drawn or not 
drawn from case study research methodology. This therefore sets a good platform for us to 












BEE is a recent phenomenon and is specific to South Africa. As indicated in Chapter 1, this creates challenges 
as there are few peer reviewed published research studies on the topic. Therefore, in relation to the BEE 
component of this study we will analyse legislation, reviews of legislation and analyse actual case studies. 
In this chapter we will also study in particular the BEE Scorecard which companies are expected to comply 
with. Also we investigate the LBOs functioning and economic theories which explain why they occur in the 
first place. Secondly, what makes them succeed and fail? We do that to see whether those factors will have a 
similar impact on BEE funding structures. We also want to know how the LBOs risks are mitigated. Again we 
do that to understand whether similar strategies can be employed by BEE investors, and if not, why. All this is 
premised on the understanding that both LBOs and BEE funding structures are highly leveraged. 
2.1. The BEE Scorecard and Net Equity Value 
It was indicated above that there is a BEE Scorecard whose purpose is to indicate the contribution of an 
enterprise to BEE. The government gazetted the generic scorecard as part of the Codes of Good Practice. It is 
called generic because it can be used in all industries. Other industries have got sector specific charters, like 
the Financial Sector Charter, the Mining Charter, the Agriculture BEE Charter, etc. 
The elements of the scorecard and their weightings are as follows:-
:.) Equity ownership - 20% 
:.) Management - 10% 
:.) Employment equity - 10% 
:.) Skills development - 20% 
:.) Preferential procurement - 20% 
:.) Enterprise development - 10% 
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Exhibit 2 Ownership Element of the Scorecard (Statement 100) 










Briefly let us look at some of the sub-categories of Statement 100 and understand what they exactly mean. In 
particular our interest is in the economic interest in the enterprise to which black people, black women and 
designated groups are entitled to. In total this amounts to 7 points although with different weightings. In the 
Codes Economic Interest is defined as, '~ .. a claim against an enterprise representing a return on ownership of 
the enterprise similar in nature with a dividend right"r measured using the Flow Through ancf where 
app//cable, the Modified Flow -Through Principles'; (Governme nt of South Africa 2007:24). The Flow 
Through Principle is intended to ensure that value accrues to natural persons and not complicated legal 
structures. Generally speaking economic interest will be that percentage which entitles you to dividends of the 
company from the first day. It is thus different from the Net Equity Value which always takes debt into 
consideration. 
Economic interest points are calculated as follows:-
Economic Interest points = (economic interest held by the participants of that indicator as a 
total of economic interest/compliance target of the indicator) x weighting points for that 
ownership criterion 
What should be noted here is that economic interest pOints are different from net equity value which in most 
cases will be known at the end of the period which is covered by the structure. 
However, our investigation is on the Net Equity Value (NEV) section of the ownership scorecard. Therefore we 
will not be taking the discussion around the other elements of statement 100 any further. Our focus is on Net 
Equity Value segment of the realization points of the ownership scorecard. As can be seen above the total 
equity ownership points, including bonus pOints is 23 points. 7 pOints are allocated to NEV, the highest score 
in the whole scorecard. This signifies the importance given by government to NEV. 
Net Equity Value "is defined as the value of the instruments to which a black participant's equity interest 
attaches in a measured enterprise (including without limitation, the value of economic interest received since 
date of acquisition of the instruments) after deducting the value of any third party rights or claims that may 
exist against the black participant rights or claims that may exist against the black participant (including 
without limitation, the value of all interest payable in respect of such transactions)measured as a percentage 
of the total value of the Measured Enterprise (all valuations must be undertaken in accordance with an 
Acceptable Valuation Standard)", (Balshaw et. al. 2005:101). Jack defines Net Equity Value as "the market 
value of the Black participant's equity above acquiSItion debt specific to ownership of that equity (deemed net 
value); reflected as a percentage of the targeted BEE ownership of the measured entity against preset annual 
targets, (Jack and Harris etc 2007: 196). 
The NEV of BEE which measures unencumbered black shareholding can be calculated as follows: 
NEV = (Market value of the equity instrument) - (Capital balance of the acquisition loan) / 










BEE Ratings and Ownership 
The Financial Mail publishes with Empowerdex every year the top BEE 200 companies ranked on the basis of 
the generic BEE Scorecard. Exhibit 3 presents the top 75 companies from the 2007 survey published by the 
Financial Mail. Empowerdex is an independent BEE ratings agency which calculates company BEE scores 
based on company information. The total score includes scores for each component and equity ownership 
counts for 20 pOints (%). Exhibit 3 depicts the scores the total BEE score per company and the total pOints 
eamed for the equity ownership component, which is the focus of this study. 
In Annexure A to this study we have presented the financial ratios of each BEE rated company based on 
information extracted from the FA Macgregor data base. 
It will be noted from Exhibit 3, that whilst some companies score quite highly in terms of the total BEE score, 
the ownership score may be low. Companies such as Primedia (63.14:5.58) Harmony Gold (53.98:7.00) 
Foschini (45.98:4.95), Standard Bank (50.72:5.60), and First Rand (50.38:3.75) score low on ownership but 
have a total BEE score above 50%. Of the top 75 BEE rated companies in South Africa, there are 22 
companies with an ownership score less than 10 and there are 44 companies with a score of less than 15. 
There are 23 points in the generic BEE scorecard for the ownership component subject to a maximum score 
of 20 points. Therefore, the indicated ownership scores indicates the distance that some of the most highly 











10 Sldvest Group 
11 Glenrand MIB 
12 Phumelela 
13 Pnmedia 
14 Trans Hex 
15 Old Mutual P,C 
16 MTN Group 
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22 Barnard Jacobs Mel 
23 Nedbank 
24 Business Conn 
25 Gold Fields 





















































26 Exxaro Recources 
27 Hanmony Gold 
28 Group Five 
29 Aveng 
3D African Rainbow 
31 Sun International 
32 Absa Group 
33 Mutual and Federal 
34 J asco Electronics 
35 Faritec 
36 Aspen Pharmacy 
37 STD Bank 
38 Mustek 
39 First Rand 
40 Impenal 
41 Edcon 
42 Alexander Forbes 
43 Santam 
44 Enviroserv 
45 Super Group 
46 Distell Group 
47 Advtech 
48 Foschini 
49 Merafe Resources 
50 Distribution& Ware 





















































51 Com air 
52 SABMiliar Pic 
53 Impala Platinum 
54 Coronation Fund 
55 Brimstone Investm 
56 Mvelaphanda Gr 
57 Compu-Cleanng 
58 Omnia 
59 LewIs Group 
60 Anglo GoldAshanu 
61 Grow1hpointProp 
62 The Sp ar Group 
63 Afncan Oxygen 
64 Network Healthcare 
65 Investec 
66 Tiger Brands 
67 Massmart 
68 Kaglso Media 
69 African Bank 





75 Control Instruments 
Exhibit] Top 75 BEE Companies In 2007: ratings by Empowerdex (2007) 



























































In Annexure A to this study, we have set out the top Empowerment companies as indicated by Empowerdex 
as well as the financial ratios extracted from BFA Macgregor. Whilst not directly relevant for this study it 
depicts an area for future research and indicates the net profit margins and Return on Equity ratios for the 
leading BEE companies in South Africa. 
As indicated above, it will be argued in this study that BEE transactions are in many cases a form of leveraged 
buyout. Therefore understanding what LBOs are, and how they work, is critical for understanding the 
problems and challenges faced by BEE transactions. Further, this study investigates similarities and 
differences between the LBOs and BEE transactions. To accomplish this, a brief literature review will be 
undertaken to better understand why and how LBOs work. We will continue to evaluate BEE transactions, 
which are generally highly leveraged in terms of the critical features required to ensure that LBOs are 
successful. 
2.1.1. Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) and Black Economic Empowerment transaction 
A leveraged buyout is a process whereby an investor or group of investors gains control of a 
majority of a target company's equity using borrowed money or debt. This is also referred to as 
"bootstrap" transaction. This is using other people's money to gain control of another company. 
Olsen defines a leveraged buyout, or LBO, as "an acquisition of a company or division of another 
company financed with a substantial portion of borrowed funds' (Olsen, 2000: 1). Fox and 
Marcus state, "LBOs take place when a firm is "taken private" - the company's equity is bought 
up and removed from publicly traded security markets', (Fox and Marcus 1992:63). The most 
common form of an LBO is the Management Buyout, commonly known as an MBO. This occurs 
when management of the target company acquires the majority of equity of that company, again 
mainly using debt financing. Vuyo Jack quotes an American MBA student who described the 
entire BEE funding mechanism as, "one big leveraged buyout (LBO) of the economy in South 
Africa". Jack continues and states, "This is somewhat true because there is not much black 
capital to purchase most of these stakes in established companies. Therefore, debt is the most 
accessible capital that can be utilized for BEE deals'; (Jack 2006: 20). This provides support for 
the objective of this study in trying to understand LBOs with an aim of gaining more insight into 
the BEE funding structures and their likely outcomes 
In an LBO, the range of own capital to debt ranges from 30% to 70%, up to the most aggressive 
structures of 5% of own capital to 95% of debt. It is agreed now that LBOs result in higher debt 
levels. The observation by Fox and Marcus in this regard is instructive. They observed, "In 
companies subject to LBOs, debt goes up dramatically. In 76 buyouts that occurred between 
1980 and 1986, the median book value of debt to total capItal jumped from 18% to 88,4%", 











There are certain critical success factors or characteristics that apply to most LBOs. Unfortunately 
these have been ignored by investors who in certain instances are too eager to acquire the 
business. In the early years of LBOs, from the late 1950's and up to the 1990's the main driver of 
this was the belief by the acquirer that it could introduce efficiencies once the business had been 
taken over. It has been argued that, initially LBOs concentrated in extracting efficiencies from 
their operations. Olsen argues that "LBO firms today are seeking to build value in acquired 
companies by improving profitabilitYt pursuing growth including roll-up strategies (in which an 
acquired company serves as a ''platform'' for additional acquisItions of related businesses to 
achieve critical mass and generate economies of scale/ and improving corporate governance to 
better align management incentives with those of shareholdersr~ (Olsen, J, 2000: 1). However it 
is argued that in most cases this type of restructuring has been exhausted, more reliance today 
is placed on complex financial engineering, capital structure and a focus on revenue and profits. 
(a reference or justification is required for this argument) 
Many theories have implications for various aspects of LBOs and should therefore be examined. 
These include Free Cash-Flow Theory, the Modigliani - Miller Theorem, Trade-off Theory and 
Agency Cost Theory. This list is by no means exhaustive, but these will elucidate research and 
studies which have been conducted in this regard. 
Free Cash Flow 
This theory argues that a company with the ability to generate sizable amounts of free cash flow 
from operations is a good candidate for a leveraged buyout. Put differently, the existence of free-
cash flow is a necessary, although not sufficient condition for the LBO. Free-cash flow is defined 
as, "cash in excess of that required to fund all of firms projects that have positive net present 
values when discounted at the relevant cost of capItal', (Fox and Marcus 1992:66). It also 
means that firms with free cash flow need to be restrained from investing the free cash flow in 
high risk investments. A high level of debt ensures that management is highly focused and 
disciplined. "It replaces discretionary expenditures and forces management to focus on 
profitability and cash flows", (Fox and Marcus, 1992:64). 
In most cases the debt will be posted in the acquired company's balance sheet and the acquired 
company's free cash flow will be utilized to pay the debt. It is critical to realize that there is much 
reliance on the company's free cash flow, or the ability of the management to generate that 
cash. It can already be seen that if anything, be it economical or managerial, were to make that 
impossible, the seeds of failure will be sowed already. An obvious factor may be changing 
interest rates. Increasing interest rates no doubt will put a squeeze on the company's free cash 
flow, and thus on the company's ability to service the debt. A concern has been raised by some 











a company's balance sheet. LBOs of investment grade-rated companies tend to trigger 
downgrades to the high yield market'; (Simensen, 2005:41). 
Edcon's acquisition by a private equity firm resulted in a rating downgrade and affected the 
securitization of its card debtors. Laughlin (2006) counters this argument by stating that today 
companies are willing to sacrifice their ratings if the LBO transaction makes economic sense. She 
states that, "We've noticed that weak investment grade companies are happy, for strategic 
reasons, going into Baa rated land If there was a strategic transaction that made sense. Whereas 
before, culturally, the concept of an investment grade company accepting the idea of going into 
junk would not have made sense'; (Laughlin, K, 2006:1). Free Cash Flow theory therefore 
suggests that a company which is able to generate sizable amounts of free cash flow from 
operations remains a target for LBOs. Fox & Marcus stress the attractiveness of cash by saying, 
" The occurrence of LBOs is positively related to the existence of target firms that have free and 
stable cash flows'; (Fox & Marcus 1992:67). 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
The Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem examines the effect of capital structure on the value of the 
firm. As an LBO results in a change to the capital structure of the firm being bought, the findings 
of M&M may be relevant to LBOs in terms of value changes, as might the implications of the 
modified M&M Theory. The gist of the theory is better summarized in the following quote, "In 
their path breaking article on the cost of capital Modigliani and Mtller(1958) demonstrated that 
in the absence of bankruptcy costs and tax subsIdies on the payment of interest the value of the 
firm is independent of the financial structure', (Jensen, M et al. 1976:332). MM initially stated 
that there is no optimal capital structure and changing a firm's capital structure will not change 
the value of the firm. The MM theory argues strongly that it is the assets of the firm which 
determine its value, and not the way it is financed. Therefore, a firm's weighted cost of capital 
will not change. "This occurs because, as the company increases its debt (which is cheaper than 
equity/ it is increasing its risk" (Correia et. al. 2007:14-7). However this theory is based on 
many strict assumptions, including the assumptions that there are no taxes, no transaction costs, 










2.1.4. Trade-Off Theory 
There is evidence which refutes the strict assumptions of Modigliani and Miller. For instance, 
when the assumption of no taxes is relaxed the picture changes. Interest on debt is tax 
deductible, therefore making debt cheaper, and the value of a geared firm will be higher by the 
discounted value, or present value, of the tax saved. This implies that the optimal debt ratio is 
100%. The aggressive financing of some leveraged buyouts and private equity transactions may 
reflect an application of this theory. However, the more plausible approach over the longer term 
will be the Trade-off Theory. This theory argues that the cost of equity and cost of debt will 
increase as leverage is increased, but only after a certain level of debt financing due to the costs 
of financial distress. Initial increments of debt financing will reduce the cost of capital and 
increase the value of the firm but as the probability of failure increases with further increases in 
debt levels, then the cost of debt and the cost of equity will rise due to the increased risk of 
bankruptcy and financial distress. 
It is called trade-off theory because companies are seen to "trade-off the advantage of debt 
financing with the costs of taking on increasing levels of financial leverage, such as higher 
interest rates and potential bankruptcy"(Correia et a1.2007: 14-10). 
In the context of BEE transactions, it will be important to analyse what the impact of rising 
interest rates will be, especially on the value that will finally vest in the BEE parties. Bankruptcy 
or financial distress is indeed a possibility but we shall deal with this later in our investigation. 
However, BEE financing structures may include provisions which in effect protects the firm from 
bankruptcy but ensures that the black equity ownership is effectively diluted to zero and the 
shares revert to the vendor. 
Another reason cited for LBOs, is the desire of the company to be shielded from the scrutiny of 
being a public company. Remember that in many LBOs, a public entity will be delisted, 
particularly when linked to a private equity transaction. In case of an MBO, this gives an 
opportunity for managers to be significant owners of a firm's equity, thus aligning the interests of 
shareholders with those of management. Also it has been found that using leverage in 
acquisitions control debt. Jensen argues, "Many of the benefits in going private and leveraged 
buyout (LBO) transactions seem to be due to the control function of debt,(Jensen1986:325). 
Managers realize that they must pay high interest charges and repay the principal amount. \\ This 
can force management to focus on certain initiatives such as divesting non-core businesses, 
downsizing, cost cutting or investing in technological upgrades that might otherwise be 
postponed or rejected outright', (Olsen, J 2000, 3). It can be seen that here LBOs can be used 










2.1.5. Agency Cost Theory 
Agency Costs have been cited as one of the reasons why there will be LBOs and MBOs. This 
theory is based on the divergent interests sometimes between managers on one hand and 
shareholders on the other. " We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between two (or 
more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representatives for 
the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems", (Ross 
1973: 134). Managers can therefore be defined as agents because they are designated by the 
shareowners (principals), to manage the business on their behalf. This theory argues that"the 
maximization of utility of the agent is not congruent with the maximization of the utility of the 
principal." " ... in addition there will be some divergence between the agent's decisions and those 
decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal", (Jensen and Meckling 1976:308). 
In other words managers will not always act in the best interest of the shareholders. It is also 
argued that this problem will be more severe where there is a lot of free cash flow. This problem 
is well captured by Smith, 1776, as cited by Jensen and Meckling, 1976 when he says, "the 
directors of such (Joint-stocks) companies/ being the managers rather of other people's money 
than their own It cannot be expectert that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their owd', 
(Jensen, 1976: 305). 
The conflict between management and shareholders "arise over the optimal size of the firm and 
the payment of cash to shareholders', (Jensen, 1986:323). It is argued that managers will 
always have incentives to grow the firm beyond its optimal size because of the power they attain 
due to the resources under their management and the ability to increase managerial 
remuneration is related to firm size. Mann and Sicherman argue that, "Specifically, managers 
have incentives to use unencumbered funds to benefit themselves rather than shareholders" 
(1991 :2140). On the other hand increased payouts to shareholders reduce resources under their 
control and therefore curtail their power. In short, agency costs theory states as long as there is 
this divergence between management interests and equity owners' interest, LBOs and MBOs are 
likely to occur. Jonathan Olsen argues that to mitigate this agency cost problem "private equity 
firms typically invest alongside management", (2003:3). 
The objective function of the firm should be firm value maximization. We have indicated that 
agency costs may make the attainment of this objective difficult if not impossible. Leveraged 
buyout therefore is an attempt to reach the equilibrium position where firm value is maximized. 
Jensen (1986) describes this as the point where "the marginal costs of debt just offset the 











Lehn and Poulsen (1989) advance an argument which says going private increases shareholder 
value. In their research they say, "We find support for the hypothesis advanced by Jensen 
(1986) that a major source of stockholder gains in going private transaction is the mitigation of 
agency problems associated with free cash flow', (1989:771). 
What we have showed above with the agency costs theory is that as long as these costs are 
there, these may be an incentive for management and leveraged buyouts. 
Managerial Myopia versus Market Myopia 
One of the major criticisms of LBOs is short - termism of management. This short term focus 
may be due to the desire of management to generate cash so as to payoff the LBO debt as 
quickly as possible. This is what Michael Jensen refers to as managerial myopism. This suggests 
that managers are interested in increasing accounting earnings and not the value of the firm. For 
instance management may compromise spending on research & development and maintenance 
(where maintenance may be necessary) again as a way of trying to generate cash to payoff the 
debt. This then shows that management in LBO may focus on short term cash generation to the 
detriment of the long term objectives. 
The myopic market hypothesis argues that ''security markets are shortsighted and undervalue 
future cash flows while overvaluing near - term cash flows': Jensen (1988) argues that there is 
little or no evidence supporting both managerial and market myopia. He says managerial myopia 
occurs when management holds little stock in their companies and when they are oblivious to 
the forces that determine stock values. He cites many examples which prove that market myopia 
does not exist. He argues, "The mere fact that price-earnings ratios differ w/dely among 
securities indicates the market is valuing something other than current earnings'; (Jensen, M.e. 
(1988). He also shows that the market will always respond positively to announcements of 
increased investments. 
The above argument is a clear indication that LBOs are here to stay because they have 
conSistently delivered value to the shareholders. Obviously this does not suggest that there are 
no risks associated with them. A major risk arises when the economy weakens and therefore 
financing dries up. Kate (2007) states that, "Companies exposed to commodities prices, ftke 
chemicals or all and energy, are facing substantial margin squeezes .... Their larger, less 
leveraged competitors can deal with a cyclical downturn, [but) when you're as leveraged as 
some of these companies are, there isn't a capacity to absorb a cyclical margin squeeze and deal 










2.2. Leveraged buyouts and BEE transactions 
In J leveraged buyout and particularly in a management buyout, the firm will be highly leveraged with up to 
90 percent of the cost of acquisition being financed with debt. In a BEE transaction, debt ratios may exceed 
this level, with more than 95 percent of the cost of shares in the firm being financed with debt. Therefore in 
both LBO and BEE transactions, this results in very high financial leverage ratios. 
However, in an LBO the high financial leverage occurs within the firm so that the firm's assets are subject to 
high levels of debt and interest is tax deductible. The tax deductibility of interest is important to any LBO 
transaction, particularly in relation to the senior tier or first tranches of debt finance. Fox and Marcus make 
the point when they say, "Tax savings provide a strong incentive for LBO's, (1992:71). 
In many BEE transactions, the financial leverage is not within the firm but outside the firm in the investment 
holding company. This means that the BEE investment holding company is highly leveraged with debt or with 
preference share finanCing. Recently, BEE transactions are resulting in high debt ratios in the firm as a BEE 
transaction will require the transfer of the assets and business to a new operating company which will raise 
debt finance to fund the acquisition of the business from the vendor. The BEE party will acquire a direct 
holding in the shares of the operating company. This is more akin to the normal LBO transaction and will be 
described in greater detail in the study. 
LBOs and MBOs that are subject to highly leveraged financing structures include varying layers of debt 
financing involving senior secured and unsecured loan finance, and mezzanine finance which represents 
subordinated debt that ranks after senior debt for repayment. Mezzanine finance will result in higher rates of 
interest and will involve acquiring a share of the company's equity by the mezzanine finance provider at a 
nominal cost. Senior debt will be provided by the commercial banks. Olsen says, "Bank debt is the most 
senior claim against the cash flows of business,and is repaid first with its interest and principal payments 
taking precedence .... ", (2002:4). 
In many of the traditional BEE transactions, the financing involved mainly vendor financing and limited senior 
debt financing and the security for any such financing was the equity in the underlying company. Due to the 
tax consequences of borrowing for the purchase of shares, which resulted in the non-deductibility of interest, 
vendors and banks provided financing in the form of preference share funding with the dividend rate set at 
around 70-74% of the bank prime overdraft rate. The bank or vendor would obtain the STC credits arising 
from preference dividend income and such preference dividend income was not taxable for the bank enabling 
the bank to effectively reduce the cost of borrowing by transferring effectively some of the tax shield to the 
BEE investors. However, the prime rate is set at significant premium to the risk-free rate and resulted in a 










However, recent BEE financing structures which involve the transfer of assets and business to a new company 
increasingly reflect the type of structures involved in a leveraged buyout. (The Hulamin BEE structure is a 
typical example). Also see Exhibit 17 to see how this structure operates. 
The discussion on LBOs puts us in a better position to identify and discuss briefly critical success factors for a 
leveraged buyout and to relate these to a BEE transaction. They can be summarized as follows: 
(i) The target company should have excellent free cash flow generating capability to sustain 
interest and capital repayments as well as stable cash flows. Fox et al concludes, "The 
occurrence of LBOs is positively related to the existence of target firms that have free and 
stable cash flow', (1992:67) .. The target company should have quality assets which can be 
used as security for loan finance. 
(ii) The target company should have low capital spending requirements in the future to enable 
the company to focus on repaying debt 
(iii) The target company should be able to offer high returns on operating assets. 
(iv) The target company should have a very low debt ratio and significant borrowing capacity. 
(v) Timing of an LBO is critical. This is even more so in cyclical companies. It has been proven 
that managing a highly leveraged company during recession may prove to be a mammoth 
task. Therefore cyclical businesses should be approached with caution. 
(VI) LBOs that occur in periods of low interest rates have a higher probability of success.It is also 
highly recommended to invest with management. This will ensure the alignment of 
management and shareholder interests, thus reducing agency costs. Lehn et al. support this 
view when they argue that, "We find support for the hypotheSiS advanced by Jensen (1986) 
that a major source of stockholder gains in going private transactions is the mitigation of 
agency problems associated with free cash floW' (1989:771). Management will be highly 
incentivised from a financial perspective and will obtain a high degree of control over the 
operating assets and direction of the firm. 
(VIi) High debt levels should be reduced to reasonable levels within a period of five to ten years 
from operating cash flows or the sale of non-core assets or divisions. 
Although, LBOs in the USA and Europe have been successful, the reality is that there were many LBOs from 
the 1980s that went into bankruptcy in the recession of 1991-92. The expected failure rate was about 50 per 
cent at the time. However, in a recent study undertaken by Lerner and Gurung (2008), it was found that 6% 
of buyouts ended in bankruptcy. 
In a normal LBO, it is the company that will fail whilst in the traditional BEE financing structure; it is the BEE 
entity that will fail. Recently, in BEE transactions involving the transfer of the business to a new company, it 
is the company that may fail and this means that BEE transactions will be similar to a normal LBO situation. 










2.3. Comparing Leveraged Buyout Success Factors and BEE 
Now that '/'ie understand the success factors of LBOs, we are proceeding to see how these compare with BEE. 
In other words we want to see to what extent are these conditions likely to occur in BEE transactions. Will 
the factors applying to BEE transactions increase the probability of succeeding or failure? 
(i) Free- cash flow generating capability is critical for LBOs survival as indicated above. Unfortunately 
this is not always the case with BEE transactions. Companies are required by law to enter into 
BEE transactions, especially if they hope to do business with government or state owned 
enterprises. In fact the inability of the company to generate excess free cash-flow may be the 
main driver for the company to do BEE transaction because it wants to have access to lucrative 
government business. This will then make it difficult for the company to pay preference 
dividends, interest on debt, let alone the repayment of capital. This will then increase the 
possibility of BEE transaction to fail. 
(ii) As indicated many white companies accept now that they should do BEE transactions for their 
own survival. The quality of assets to secure loans is therefore not a consideration for these 
companies. Didata for instance is an IT company which does not have the quality assets we are 
referring to, yet it had to do an empowerment transaction. This means that even companies with 
poor quality assets will continue with BEE transactions. This again will raise the chances of 
bankruptcy and failure for the BEE Company. 
(IIi) Do companies which have done BEE transactions postpone capital expenditures so as to focus on 
debt repayment for BEE? There is no empirical evidence to support this proposition. Companies 
continue with their programmes. Remember if shareholders of white companies were to be told 
that the "cost" of BEE is to postpone capital expenditure for the business, they will mostly likely 
resist it. So for the company it becomes business as usual. Whether the BEE Company is able to 
payor not, is less of their concern. In any case that just increases BEE partners' indebtedness. 
This will either be capitalized or be postponed to the maturity of the lock-in period, where the 
BEE investor will have to refinance this or sell it to the white company. That is what happened 
with Bidvest, where Dinatla BEE partners had to sell part of their shareholding back to the 
company, (at a huge discount to Bidvest) and pay the debt. Although this did not lead to Dinatla's 
bankruptcy, it did reduce their announced shareholding substantially. It is however safe to 
conclude that this important element of LBOs success is not always there in most BEE 
transactions. 1 










(IV) With LBOs and MBOs management which has either been brought in or in case of an MBO, 
management who are now equity holders ensures that they generate higher returns from 
operating assets. What happens in a BEE is that in most cases BEE partners will not have any 
management involvement. At best they will have a Board seat. Even in instances where 
companies are willing to give a management position, BEE parties are reluctant to take them 
because they are seen as ceremonial. Also BEE partners do not want to be locked in management 
of the company which will only mature in 10 years. Whatever the reason of not being involved in 
management, the fact of the matter is that there is no guarantee of higher returns for a BEE 
partner. Thus again increasing the probability of failure for the BEE company. 
(v) It is argued that the target company should have a low debt ratio to allow it to be able to borrow 
should it want to. The leverage ratio of a target company is in most cases not a consideration. It 
may be low, which will be more coincidental then design. 2 
(vi) Timing is critical for successful LBOs. This is even so for cyclical businesses as indicated above. 
However, this is not a consideration for BEE transactions. This is so because the established 
company decides when it is opportune for it to do an empowerment transaction. This is more 
driven by BEE requirements for the company. BEE companies then go and bid for that BEE 
opportunity. The BEE Company does this without considering the cyclical nature of the business. 
So if the opportunity came at the wrong time, no doubt that this could increase the chances of 
bankruptcy. 
(vii) BEE companies like LBOs are highly leveraged. The LBOs are mostly likely to occur when the 
interest rates are low and equity values are high. In South Africa the interest rates have been on 
the rise for some time now, with prime rate rising to 14% from the low of 10%. There is no 
indication that BEE transactions which are highly leveraged are slowing down. On the contrary 
the Codes of Good practice and other Sector Charters have been adopted in the rising interest 
rate climate. The point is that BEE transactions are not waiting for interest rates to start 
decreasing. We indicated above that high interest rates put more burden on BEE investors. High 
interest rates increase the probability of BEE failure. We will also indicate in the later chapter that 
high interest rates reduce net equity value for BEE investors. 










(viii) MBOs ensure that agency costs risks are mitigated. With BEE investors it is difficult to invest with 
management because most companies are managed by white managers who do not qualify for 
BEE pOints. The advantages of investing with management are thus lost for BEE investors. This 
again does not help the course of BEE investors. They continue relying on old managers and 
therefore nothing new can be expected. 
(ix) Contrary to what happens to LBOs where high debt levels reduce in a period of 5 to 10 years 
because management focus on cash generating activities like selling of non-core assets, 
downsizing, amongst others, BEE transactions may increase debt levels during that time. BEE 
investors have no control over the assets. The increased debt levels could increase risk failure for 
BEE investors. 
(x) BEE investors often help to create post BEE value by representing the firm to some clients, and 
enabling the company to qualify for lucrative opportunities that require doing business with 
empowered companies. That created value will be shared by all the shareholders. However the 
share price that BEE investors are paying may include BEE created value. It is common for 
companies to announce that they will be doing a BEE transaction before they fix the price. The 
share price in most instances will increase around the time of the announcement3. The BEE 
partner then finds itself paying for the value they have created. 
2.4. Equity Returns in RSA 
We shall demonstrate in the next chapter that the success of BEE transactions by and large depends on the 
equities market performance. It will be shown in some of the sensitivity analysis that the NEV to BEE is so 
much dependent on the performance of equities. However to understand and measure equity performance it 
is important to understand the equity risk premium concept since it is very critical to intelligently project the 
future performance of a particular stock. Dimson defines equity risk premium as "the incremental return that 
shareholders require from holding risky equities rather than risk-free securities', (Dimson et.a!. 2002:1). 
Correia defines it as "the additional return that investors will demand for investing in ordinary shares rather 
than government bonds', (Correia 2007: 3-19). In short, the equity premium can be defined as the difference 
between the return on risky stocks and return on safe bonds. 
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:ity risk premium may be calculated using many approaches, including Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(C/\p~~)4and Dividend growth model. Based on (APM approach and assuming a Beta of 1, market risk 
premium is equal to expected rate of return on equity capital less risk free rate of return. E(Rp) = E (Re) -
Rf. 
On the other hand Dividend growth rate model says: 
Cost of Equity = D/Market Value + g, where 
D/Market Value = dividend yield, and g expected growth in dividend. 
What is evident from the definitions above is that investors know and expect equities to be more risky than 
government bonds and securities. That being the case it should be expected that investors will require higher 
returns from equities. The risks are mainly economic risks and the volatility of the stock market. The 
corporate disasters of Barings Bank and Enron are a living examples of the risks associated with equity 
markets. It is thus not unreasonable for investors to expect higher returns when they invest in equities 
market. 
2.4.1. Determining Market Equity Returns 
The success of BEE transactions are significantly affected by market equity returns. In this 
section, we will evaluate market equity returns over the long-term and in a later chapter we will 
relate the likely performance in equities will have on the BEE ownership in the net equity of 
companies. We now know that investors expect higher returns from equities than government 
bonds and other securities. The question is how big those returns should be. We need to 
establish that if we are to forecast the future performance of the equities. To do this we shall be 
looking at how JSE-listed equities have performed over a long time period and look at the survey 
conducted by Pricewaterhouse(oopers (2005). Based on insights obtained, it will be possible to 
analyse the potential impact of future market changes on BEE transactions. The reason we do 
this is to get as close as possible to the net equity value that is likely to transfer to BEE partners 
at the expiry of lock in periods we will be investigating. 










2.4.2. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
It is important to understand what CAPM says before we use it. This is so because CAPM 
continues to be a popular approach to pricing of capital assets. CAPM holds that, " a certain level 
of risk applies in a market to all capital assets and must be borne by the investor, while other risk 
is peculiar to the specific asset and can be eliminated through diversification", (Correia et. al. 
2007: 1-25). Simply put, CAPM says that the expected return that the investor hopes to get, will 
be equal to the rate on a risk free security, (like a government bond) plus a risk premium. 
CAPM says risk is both systematic risk and specific risk. Specific risk is the risk associated with 
the chosen asset. Systematic risk on the other hand, " is the risk of a firm that contributes to the 
overall market portfolio - a portfolio that contains a weighted average of all capital assets" 
(Dowjones 2001:1). CAPM holds that the marketplace compensates investors for taking 
systematic risk of holding the market portfolio. 
Consider the following CAPM Equation: 
E(Re) = Rf + ~ x E(Rp) 
Where: 
E(Re) = Expected rate of return on equity capital - is the expected annual return as a 
percentage on this specific asset, (f). This represents what an investor hopes to achieve by 
taking the risk. 
Rf = Risk-free rate of return - This is the return expected from government bonds. It is said to 
be risk free because the probability of government to default on their bonds is close to zero. 
~ = Beta - This is a measure of the extent to which an asset's expected return can be expected 
to change given some change in the market portfOlio. In other words Beta measures volatility of 
a share in relation to the rest of the market. It should be noted that the market portfolio has a 
Beta of 1. The Betas greater than 1 are riskier than the market portfolio. On the contrary Betas 
less than 1 are less riskier than the market portfolio. 
E(Rp) = Expected market risk premium - This is the return that includes risk adjustment for risks 
that the investor takes by investing into a particular stock. 
CAPM therefore says the market will give returns to investors who take systematic risks, but 











Although (APM is widely used by many analysts, it does have its drawbacks. Some of the 
assumptions it is based on are herculean, and are difficult to obtain in the real world. 
Anlollgst the assumptions that it makes is that investors are risk averse and they maximize the 
expected utility of their end period wealth. This makes a one period model. It also assumes 
symmetric distribution of information to investors. This is not always true, usually we encounter 
skewed distribution of information. It also assumes that borrowing rate is equal to the lending 
rate. It also assumes there are no taxes, regulations or restrictions on short selling, i.e. it 
assumes a perfect market. This may be difficult to find in the real world. 
Historical Performance of RSA Equities 
When looking at equity risk premium it is important to take a long term view. Short to medium 
term view can be very erratic. For instance before the technology bubble burst in the late 
nineties investors expected long-run stock market returns to deliver double digit percentage 
returns. Dimson et. al therefore argues, "To understand the risk premium, .... , we need to 
examine periods that are much longer than one or two years, or even a decade. This is because 
stock markets are volatile, with much variation in year - to- year retumsr/(Dimson et al 2002: 2). 
Below is the table which shows what Dimson found as far as the performance of equities over a 
102 year period. He found that over this period the annualized equity risk premium, relative to 
bills was 4.5% for the UK, 5.6% for the USA. South Africa's equity risk premium was higher 
(because of higher equity returns over the period), when compared to most of the countries 
under review. RSA's equity risk premium was found to be 6.1%. 
Taking the arithmetic mean to forecast the equity premium for different countries, he concludes 
that they will be lower than the historical performance. Obviously South Africa's risk premium 
should be higher because of perceived higher risks. Therefore based on historical performance of 
South African equities and a risk premium of say, 5%, the expected annual equity return is 
approximately 14% if we use a risk-free rate of 9% (which in late 200lreflected the risk-free 
rate), then the expected return from investing in ordinary equities is; 
In South Africa it has been found that investors have shifted from the RSA R153 Bond (R1S3) to 
RSA R157 as a proxy for the risk-free rate. This was confirmed by the 2008 PW( Survey. R157 
provides a longer term to maturity. This is also in line with many BEE transactions which has long 
term horizon. R157 therefore matches BEE investments terms. We assume Beta to be 1, as 










Equity Returns = Bond Yield + equity risk premium 










Equity risk premia (percent per year) 
cQUl TY Relative to bills Relative to bonds 
RISK 
PEMIA Geo- Arith- Geo- Arith-
AROUND 
THE metric metic metric metic 
WORLD 
1900- Country mean mean SO mean mean SO 
2001 
Australia 7.0' 8.5 17.2 6.3 7.9 18.8 
Belgium 2.7 5.0' 23.5 2.8 4.7 20.7 
Canada 4.4 5.7 16.7 4.2 5.7 17.9 
Denmark 1.6 3.2 19.4 1.8 3.1 16.9 
France 7.1 9.5 23.9 4.6 6.7 21.7 
Germany* 4.6 10.0' 35.3 6.3 9.6 28.5 
Ireland 3.4 5.3 20.5 3.1 4.5 17.3 
Italy 6.6 10.6 32.5 4.6 8.0' 30.1 
Japan 6.4 9.6 27.9 5.9 10.0' 33.2 
The Netherlands 4.8 6.8 22.3 4.4 6.4 21.5 
South Africa 6.1 8.2 22.4 5.4 7.1 19.6 
Spain 3.1 5.2 21.4 2.2 4.1 20.2 
Sweden 5.3 7.4 21.9 4.9 7.1 22.1 
Switzerland* 4.0' 5.8 19.6 2.4 3.9 18.0' 
United Kingdom 4.5 6.2 19.9 4.2 5.5 16.7 
United States 5.6 7.5 19.7 4.8 6.7 20.0' 
World 4.6 5.9 16.5 4.3 5.4 14.6 
Germany* excludes 1922-23/ Switzerland commences in 1911. 












We will not study the relative merits of using arithmetic and geometric means but business 
practitioners tend to use a market risk premium determined on a geometric basis and comparing 
the equity return to the performance of Government Bonds rather than short-term Treasury bill 
yields which can be volatile. 
In a recent survey by Dimson et al (2007), and published in the ABNAMRO jLBS Global 
Investment Returns Yearbook, it was found that South Africa recorded a real return of 7.5% over 
the period from investing in equities and a return of 1.8% from investing in bonds. The long-
term market risk premium is estimated to be 5.7%. 
PWC Survey 
In 2005 PWC Corporate Finance undertook a survey to determine which were the most used 
valuation methodologies in South Africa. This survey included 24 financial analysts and corporate 
financiers. Our interest on this survey is on the views of these analysts on equity risks premium 
required by RSA investors. It was established that most respondents use Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) to estimate cost of equity. CAPM estimates the required rate of return of an equity 
investor in the target company. 
The outcome of the survey was that over 50% of the respondents use expected market risk 
premium of between 5% and 6%. 
This is an interesting equity risk premium because it is consistent with our conclusion on the risk 
premium arrived at when using the historical approach. For the purposes of our research, it is 
thus safe to expect nominal equity returns of 15% = (9%+ 6%). This assumes a 6% MRP. In 
the following chapter we would use this equity market return expectation to estimate what NEV 
is likely to vest with BEE partners at maturity of these structures. We would like to see what does 
this mean for the attainment of BEE targets set? Also we would like to establish how long it will 











Black Economic Empowerment Transactions 
Now that we understand how leveraged buyouts work, we can proceed and look at BEE ownership and the 
typical BEE funding structures that are used. As we do that we shall be drawing similarities, where they exist, 
between these BEE funding structures on one hand,LBOs and Private Equity Investments on the other. One 
glaring similarity is that they are all very much dependant on debt to fund their transactions. However, the 
biggest difference between the two is that the power relations are different. 
In a typical LBO the buyers of the business or assets will have bigger negotiating power and a plan of what 
they will do when they get the business. They will be having clear plans what they want to do with free-cash 
flow, how long they want to be in that business and who they will be putting in management position to drive 
their strategy. In an LBO, there will be a transfer of control as there is normally a transfer of more than 50% 
of the shares in the company. In Private Equity, the private equity investor may not have a controlling 
interest but will have board representation and will have a shareholders agreement setting out what 
management mayor may not do prior to investing in the company. Whilst there has increasingly been 
competition between private equity investors thereby pushing up the prices of private equity transactions, the 
requirements set out in the shareholder agreements will remain stringent in regard to management decisions 
regarding expansion, investments and capital expenditure decisions as well as financing decisions. 
BEE parties are increasingly being required to set indicative values for any off-market transaction and due to 
competition between BEE parties, this is pushing up the prices of transactions. Secondly, BEE parties are 
required to sign restrictive and wide-ranging shareholders' agreements. 
In most cases BEE companies do not have strong negotiating power because it is the white company which 
will have initiated the process, and having to choose amongst many BEE companies who would have shown 
an interest in the said company. This is commonly known in BEE circles as "beauty parade of BEE companies'. 
Also the BEE Company in most cases does not take over the management of the business, and has no or little 
say as to what happens with free-cash flow. Although this is similar to a private equity transaction, in that the 
private equity investor does not take over the management of the company, private equity investors do place 
restrictions on operating, capex and financing decisions. 
In short the BEE Company continues to be at the mercy of the white companies, who in most cases embrace 
BEE in order to comply with government requirements and legislation, This has a bearing on the value that 










Company, whereas in a typical LBO, the new investor will decide when to sell, list or delist, depending on 
what maximizes returns on their investments. Even if the BEE partner, in its own considered view, thinks that 
it has maximized its value and the business can only go down, it cannot sell its shareholding. The opposite is 
true for an LBO. An example is the ABSA-Batho Bonke deal. The share price hit R140 per share in 2007, now 
it is at Rl03, (Sunday Times 20/01/2008). Batho-Bonke could have sold some of its equity, paid the debt, and 
remained with unencumbered equity. This would have definitely reduced exposure of the BEE to interest rate 
risk. We will analyse the effects of the ABSA share price movements on BEE ownership levels and relate this 
to the Financial Sector Charter requirements. 
3.1. BEE Funding Structures 
In this section we turn our focus to some of the mostly used BEE funding structures. It should be 
remembered that the biggest challenge of these funding structures is to sell businesses or assets to black 
entrepreneurs who do not have capital. Development Finance Institutions like Independent Development 
Corporation (IDC) and National Empowerment Fund (NEF) have been the champions of funding BEE 
transactions. Needless to say, they have limited capacity themselves. Private sector, as part of the financial 
sector charter commitments, pledged to work together with government towards funding BEE deals. This is a 
clear indication that government and private sector should co-operate for BEE objectives to be attained. 
We want to investigate the feasibility of government's target of transferring 25% of Net Equity Value (before 
any changes in the business as a result of BEE) of the economy to black people by 2014 with the structures 
that have been employed so far. Jack stresses the point that, "in a BEE conte>i0 ownership and financing are 
inextricably linked'. He continues to argue that, "While financing provIdes opportuni~ It can also come with a 
Stl;7g in the tai~ as debt hanging over a BEE party undermines ownership/~ (Jack and Harris, 2007:382). 
Therefore it is critically important to understand this sting and see how it can be mitigated by using of BEE 
friendly funding structures. To further elucidate this point we shall be looking at some case studies. 
3.1.1. Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) 
This is a mechanism which has been used to facilitate the financing by funders of BEE 
transactions. Although white shareholders would like to do BEE transactions as a business 
imperative, they are not prepared to be exposed to the risks associated with this process. An SPV 
can be defined as, " a vehicle formed specifically to facilItate financing of a BEE party where the 
party needs a combination of bank, vendor and equity finance. The BEE Company acquires the 
voting rights, but the financier enjoys the performance of the underlying shares up to a certain 
hurdle rate', (Jack 200: 383). Underneath we shall critically analyze this SPV structure. We want 










I BEE Holdings Ud I 
'00" 
""'" 
""~ ,I Sf'll Ltd I, -~-- -0% 51 ',(, 
. 
I Gig. 
The features of thos strvcture ere,-
GIO, Ltd orig!n~lly ow",xJ 100% by original shareholders and it '.",u ld like to rn" ~e a 
51% BEE de~1 with Bll Hokiifl9S Ltd; BEE '"IOi dings Ltd does not h"ve fund, 3nd 
lil~,efore it goes to the hank to raiS€ f,n",xe; 
Tnc cons!der~tlon amount is R1020~1 for 51'~(', and bEE :.,okiing5 Lid cOOlribu les RWm 
'" equity; 
SPV ltd i5 formed, and Preference ,heres of R960rn are issued to the bi'ln k at a 
divkiend rate of 74% of the p"m~ rate: the curre rt "rim~ ra le is 14.5% (December 
2007); 
!\lter thIS deal SPY Lld "owns" 51% of GIGA Ltd and the origin,,1 ~hareholde" hoki 
49'·',·; 
R82m ordinary divk1el)ds were pilid prior to tlli5 transaction with a dividend COVer of 
3,12 (I.e, R8lm dividend on earninqs of R255 .bm = -J 12j GIGr, '.",uld m"intilrn " 
col1Stant diviric rvj p"yout r..tio Dr di,KJend cover of 3.12 o'er the du,atlon if the 
transaction. 
"reference ,h~rL"' ere redeemable in 5 years in a bullet payment and tre va '"." of 










interest rate is bosc'd on t ll~ kmg term hi,torK:~'. mwket pr~miurn of 5"1, medium term 
1_ 140.;-' is a re~sotli1blc rdurn in the current interesl rale enYi'Onlllent and ba5€d on 
the kmg term hi,torK:~1 markd premium of 5%, 
'Ne are therefore going to model thi, 5C~r'k:lrkl ~nd determine pOssib le outcome" 
especia lly for BEE Holdi r<js Ltd. We r>eed to see what tile Net Fquity '';~Iu~ iKcruir>g to 
tile BEE Company is after 5 year,. 
r;:::::::::::;';='1 =;y"""" ~~~ Yr 1 ,~,}}~, 164 
Yr ,: ,« 
In tile fid year after the transactiOll, SPY Ltd \"';11 receive R45.HO million from the ordinary 
slwe, hctd in lile operalir<j col1lpany, GIGA Ltd, The total divklencl paya~e by G1G/l to it!. 
slK1rellOkJers is R89,80 millrln. Tile rrurket val"" of tile SPY', IlOkling n GIGA will ~m;)lInt to 
Rl,606,4 millkln ot the end or five ycar< wltll lil~ cxpectecl ~'(lUit)l rdurn in GIGA of 14% pel 
",,,,um for five year>. 
We will assume thal the b~nk i, willing to finance ~'-.y sllO·"ttall between the ordinary dividencl 
r~ceiv~blc by tile SPV and til~ prckr~n[~ divklerxl pay~bI~ eacil year by subscribing ror -urther 
prefererlCe shares in the SP''; I h~refoc~, the [lct doef",it is fin.:lrICcd by the is,,,,, of prel"erence 
Slla feS in tile SPY, 
In terms of Yoting control, bEF I loIdirqs owns 100% of the srv which owns 51% of tile ord,n.:lry 
>llafeS and the<'efore FIEF HokJ ings controls the operatir<j company, beir<] G1GA Ltd 11:JI'lever, 
sudl control m~y be subject to ttle terlllS of SMreholde' ~greel1lents ar>1 tile terms of slich 
sha-ellokle- <>greements Me often iligh,; restrictiye in relation to the flEE [ol1lPa~y exe,dsir.;r 
effectiye contro' 
, ''''' ,,,. F"""'" " '" 'on< " ,," tho IllL "'"""'" . ,," " " , I ~, ",,,,,,",,,,J ..., b< "","",", ["m ,,",,',,J [0. 51)% "I tl" "", ,,,,1 ' ,l~'" DU 0"", ,<i1r 










1~ >he I"~t ye~r, the SF\" wil! O'o'le t~e b"nk ~ prefere'l~e ~iv<Je,)j of R103 mii'iJn (R%O ml'lion • 
14.5% x 74%), The SP\I \',ill pay over to the tx.nk the ordn" ,-,.. diyi:lE'nd of R45,8 mi;:io~ in 
ordinary dMden~s receNe~ a,)j will iS5ue tre IJ,-,lan~e 01 R5/,2 mil';:,~ in prE'i£l'"E'CICE' -rores, 
t~ereby "'Cr""",'9 tile pl"l!ference "me ~al~n~e to R 1 017 million at tll€ end of year one" 
At the erl:l 01 riVE' ye~ rs, the b~lance 01,;"9 to the IJ"nk will ~rnourt to Rl 261 millbn whil5t the 
market valuc or t~c eq \JJ:y irwestmE'Clt in GIGA "~I' amou'lt to Rl 606 mii'ion, 
dSPV 161)6,463188 
[::::.:::.:':":':":.: ______ ~==:~:",'d'2 61 '","-~ 
r~e ,,,,t v~ll.C 0' t~" BEE sil,..-d10>:JiClg will " mou:-lt dose '_0 R345 million which amounts to 
JO,g6% d the operalirlg company, GJGA, I ~e "bovc ~",-,ly5" ,ho'h'~ th~t, unbs ~hc d"'denj 
payalJle ~y GIGA is ~t least equa l to the preference jiv>:Jen~ pay~~le by the SPV to Ire ~nk, the 
(Iebt '-0 t~e b"Clk will i ncre~o;C, Repayme'lt 01 d;v;~s a,)j capit~1 must occur;' the BEE part,,,,r 
i, not to ';Ie in ~ position, aftE'r 5 ymr>, wile,e t~e c~pital MlOUClt owing il~, i,;:re~,cd, Growth ';n 
the n,v vk, g,-oWlr in thE' equ ity v~lue :E'vcn II ,ueil gro'o'rh E'Xccej5 thE' growth in deb~) is 01 
litt'e uSC as tile equity cannO'_ be sold ~y the BEE entity to re~u(e or sett'e jelX_ 
At the m<>turity date cf the Ple'erence 5h3re~, GIGA LTD owes Rl 261 million, What ~dS 
hapxrcj to ""'rke!: capililli7~lion 0' GIGA LTD drld by ddinitlOCl to BEE Ho>:Ji,'9'-' T~c WV 
m~rket value has increase~ to Rl 61)6 mill>:>n -hi5 then resull~ in ~ NEV for lIFE I lddirg; (yja 
SPV; of' 
BEE HOLDINGS NtV = R1 606 463 198 - R1 261 332 783 - R34S 130 41S 
Thil outcome revesents 10.96% Net Fquity Value ('"NEV'·;- '0,· BEE 5PV, 1t is i~teresting to note 











If one explores this issue further, it is apparent that an annual dividend of R201.9 million would 
have to be paid by GIGA just to cover the preference dividend payment by the SPV (i.e. R201. 9 
million X 51% = Pref. dividend on R960 million at 10.73%). In year 1 this would require a 
dividend cover of R280m / R201.98m - 1.39. This is high for a growing company, but could be 
accepted for a mature company. 
To take the analysis further, an annual dividend of R505.9m would be required if the preference 
share debt plus dividend were to be repaid in five equal annul instalments (this represents the 
annual annuity payment required of R254.9m, divided by 0.51). As GIGA at no time during the 
five years has earnings of R505m per year, this analysis shows just how unrealistic the five-year 
payback period is, given the parameters stated in the model. It also highlights in clear fashion 
the particular difficulties surrounding the financing of BEE deals. 
This analysis could lead into a discussion of the ways and means by which the desired objectives 
could be achieved, e.g. by changing dividend policy by GIGA for the five year period (so that, if 
not all of the debt is repaid within the first five years, it is at least reduced significantly). A 
discounted share price to the SPV could also be conSidered, although the extent of the discount 
may at present be limited by JSE requirements. 6. These restrictions may in fact apply to all share 
sales, including BEE deals. 
What would happen to the NEV if the BEE deal is announced as a 25% transfer of equity 
ownership? In terms of the BEE Codes of Conduct, the Dn set a target of 25% equity 
ownership. However, there are Sector Charters which require a lower target of ownership such 
as 10% BEE ownership in the Financial Sector Charter. 
We will evaluate a BEE transaction which has announced a 25% transfer of ownership. This is 
more in line with the government proposition to transfer 25% of the economy to Black people by 
2014. This has prompted corporate South Africa to aim at selling 25% stake of their businesses 
to empowerment companies. We would like to see how this scenario pans out in 5 years time. 
We assume that BEE Holdings will invest R30 million in equity capital. 










If we deduct the elmi"'J b<llan.::c of tile pr~f~r~n.::~ ~hMe fU M ing f'om the market v<llue of lh~ 
Sp y ho ldir<) in the OlJ'.'!"at,.. . ooml)(!ny 'se obt~ in ~ ~kt Eq ull'f V~ I \!e uf R170 rn ill iu n which 
amounts tu 5.40% 01 !he m~rket cap rtalisat Kl n of the opcro.till9 romp~;y at tm: tm'X>. Thi., is 
dellcted i" ExM"tll. 
SPV '8-481960 
[::::.:::::.:':":":'":.: ______ .:.===-R 61 I 321'7() 
:1 we hLeCi<J the perOi to 2014, to reflect gover nrne nt's target th~t 25," , or t n~ l'COnorny .,00... Id 
be o,~",--.j by BEE erb1;,:,;, till," the 1'\(.'( eqUity .alee will rise to lUGS mlll(ln l-.flicf1 repreents 
abu~t 8.42'. of the martet ( ... pitallsa~on of tl'l<" fim', Thos "'.l long way lror1l1he goVl..""">e"t 
targ~1 of 2S',t BEE oW"Y5/lip IIy 20H. The cuttent wuctu"e wrll re;uit or government faihrg to 
meet 111> objeOlVC irJ ,,",,,ion tD BEE OW'\eI'Shop b<\:,ed on ~ cea!'olliIble /lS'Sumpt.on about equ~y 










w~ \',ill lumrn~'ise the :.it!lation for a 25% bEE transactlln over five ye~". Exhibit 10 ;;l lIltrotes 
the 'ituation wl"'r~ th:!fe i ~ ~ ~oortf~1I cf vefe r~nt ia l di.,ilicnli ~yrner.t frcm the ordi n ~rv 
div iQe I".d, '~C~"L'd, LOCJI(Jr'I<] al year 2, we see ther~ IS a p'efer""tl~1 divid~nd or R28.8 mi li lln 
which mug b~ pil>J to fund~rs, Hm"<-'v~r ~here il only 1<24.5 millkm ordinary div ilic l".d rec~ived by 
:he BFF Company to p.;y the p'efe r~I".~I~ 1 d ; v i d~rd~, We lee tll~t the slnrtfall 'Nill b~ Cilrri~li 
for,'/a'd and cap ita li red A bu! "t paynwnt ',',hrll inVDlv~1 Lh~ capit~1 ~1"K1 sllOrtfall on p'efer~nlla l 
divi[loCnd~ wdl be pilO:] at mahlrity, 
Lockir.g at Fxhiblt 11 ......, ~150 rea lire that mark:ct capital;'atk>n for BEE Holdings ho, growl" to 
R787.4 million, However, v,e ~till neeD to deduct 1<617,3 million v,h ich is owed to ~he fl1f\d~rs. 
Tt.cr~r",~ NEV tha t '.,;11 WI t ,.,;th BEE H olliing~ at matllrity il: 
BEE HOLDINGS NEV = R787481 96()- 617 32117() = R17Q 16() 790 
Again we find a vel)' _ omfortir.g result a~ far a~ the a~hienrnent of 25% transfe r or Ih~ 
ecor<lmy to bla~k hands by sell ir.g bul i ",,~~s Lo BEE p~rl""rI. Thi~ lica l which ltarLL'd ~5 ~ 2~% 
neal to BFF Inldings w.as only ab!~ to tran~fer a r""r~ 5.4C% Nd Eqllity Val"" to th~ BLF 
parlne', 
TI"'r~ ;,; no doubt that til;, bEE ho, r~.,~l lL'd in tral".skrr:ng of volu~ to this BEE Compony. The 
~rgum~nt !S thot in lros C~5~ ·",h~'~ there wos such a favO<Jrable ~co l".cm t ~I imate it sl'lI dk1 noL 
~onle 0'.1/10 be 51"1c, but 10.%"Ic , ar.d not 25% t<.IL 5.4%, 
lr. our mooel v,e ~arr~.d ouL >en~t"ity an~~'sis to tl)' ~nd unnerstand the impa ~t 01 thes~ 
ch~rg~, ir th~ t'kt Equity .,o lu ~ to BEE. 'N~ m~ i nly used sensitivity aralysi, il" ~ .,ituatiol" 'NI'!ere 
bLL I~dings buys 25% d GIGA l iD. l ros i, so be-:"<luse that is the target most companies ,d 
themselves to comply IvtIl gove'nrnen!', requirements. It is alo.o the target tl'!at the gcYerr'nent 
has >et itself to achiev" by 2014. The lo llow;ng >en5iLivity ~nalysis we re done on chan l1's il" 










3, 1. 2, 
-2000% 
Interest rate analysis 
Interest rates and net equity ownership 
The prime inlere,l rate h,a, incrf'.ased from 9,Y/, to 14,~% in ~ rew yea's, Tois is a 5'l'c increase 
in t,~e bo", fimr.:;;ng nl<' lI,ed to de lermille the ~r"'ference divider>:J r~te poyoble by l.,.", BEE 
CompollY, Ob'{lOlJsly thi':; h~5 i ncre~,ecl l"e BE~ inlere,t liat' lit".:1 interest rates were to Increase 
to 2LY',~, as it haPIJf'Il€:I in th e nineties, BEE NEV will dr"m"lK:~l t, tall l[) Ie,s t:lall 1':<:" Thi, 
clearly illll,lr&e, sells itMty 01 BEE NF'i to interest r~tes ch~nges , ThIS is becall,e [)r the h>gh 
1C'{er,,9" of l"ese B~E runding sl ructure" T:lere i~ t:1US clear rlf>gative canl>iotkln bctwe€n 
interest r"te' ch<lnge, ;:If'ld B~E NEV. Ple~se oole l h& l" is [)nt, raise, the red ~Iag aboLII: s(rne of 
the risks t~ot are "'ced ~y these strllctu res, 
Exhlhit 13 ~bove iliLlstrolles grophically lhill Ulere is ~ neg&ive relationshi~ beh\'e€n r,et [quil" 
,~Iue ~nd Ilrime interest rates. We re~lilC that t>cyar>:J 0 pnrne inle re,l rale uf 20 ,5% there is 
~b,oiutciy no bene~t fOf the BEE partner, fiooNe,er, th'!S aSlumes t~"'= onterest rote c"~rl9<-><; are 
indelJ'.'l1(knt af rnorket c~pit~lis.'ll"n changes, It is ex~eclecl that the growth 'n market 
c~p;,~li'atkln wau ld ho· reduced "y ' ncre~se, in inleresl r~l"s and we test the combinecl 
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"il"'. I 
.~s5Um~ a market capitaklati growth rat~ of 10"10 p.a .. ~s indicatL'(\ t:dom, the effect of this i, 
a drastic decr""se in t l'>.J BEE HOkitrl]S NL{ Eq uity va iLE to 5A'Ia. A]a in thi; d~al was supposM 
to be a 2~% d~al. Th is 
annou nced 5 years 09<1, In 
market grm'lth rate arid N 
capitalilaticn w:1I r~sult in 
is disappointing, bec~ule it is much klw~r than what was 
exhit<! we see a positrve correlat~ n between ~quity 
for BEE investors. How~v~ r, ~v~n a 25% ]rowlh In m,,,ket 
15% Nd Equity Value uwnership. This growth in ""'rket 
cap;talisation i; nol suS(DO-,a~e in lh~ bn] tlO'fm but ""'y occur for some years such al in the 
pc:rroo 20M to 2006. 
Trc graph above show. that there is a P'l"tive correlatbn bet\veen Net Equity Vallie lo Bll 
inve"'or, and growth in market cal~talilat~n. Allhough lhi; deal w~ s annuuncM as ~ 2S% ~EE 
deal, th~ r~ality is lhat tDe riMI oulcome ;; much d~pendent 1;<1 , amoogst other th ing, .. grOl'flh 
r~les in rrnrket cap<tali7Jtbn during the perkld Imder coosideration. 
Howe""" in order to i>CIliev~ a 25' .. " ~quily ownership, the annolJnced BEE transactio n neWs to 
Lc In the ord~r of S5% if we a"utne a market capitalisation ]rowlh or 1;)'/0 p"r year and 8% 
growt h in divider.:1s per)'liM until 2011. 
",v~ eslabiishL'C1 in the previulJ.!; chapl~" lhal ~xpectM equity mark~t growth IS 15'\,_ B<l>ffi on 
this we tan say tha t i'IEV that will "nally lrartsf~r to the ~l:~ p<trtn~r at most will be 7% _ rhis is 










3.1.2.1. Analysis of the Growth Rate in Ordinary Dividends 
The expected growth rate in Ordinary dividends payable by the operating company to the BEE 
Company (SPV) will affect the Net Equity Value and this is depicted in the following exhibit. 
A dividend cover of 3.1 per year will result in a 3.4% net equity value equity ownership at the 
end of year 5. Although NEV growth is not as significant, debt reduction is maximized as 
dividend growth is increased .. A change in dividend policy is required for the BEE Company to 
be able to service its debt and once the debt has been paid off, the desired NEV will be 
achieved. A change in dividend cover to 1.4 per year which is very demanding, will increase 
the NEV to only 3.9% under the current situation which indicates that NEV is less sensitive to 
ordinary dividend growth than to the growth rate in market capitalisation and a higher cost of 
funding. 


































Exhibit 15 Changes in divIdend cover and Net Equity Value Ownership 
We will now evaluate the sensitivity of changes to NEV to combined changes in the prime 










3.1.2.2. Simultaneous Changes in both the Equity i'1arket Growth Rate and Interest 
Rates 
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This structure has been criticized as having benefited more the banks, and not the intended 
beneficiaries. This is mainly because of very high hurdle rates which are set. Unfortunately 
the BEE partners have very little option and end up accepting unfavourable terms. On the 
other hand the white company continues to enjoy BEE benefits. This model came under 
heavy criticism especially towards the end of the last decade because the stock market did 
not perform. Global stock markets crashed, and companies' performance fell short of the cash 
flow required to pay preference dividends or interest. It was reported that banks may 
c.dpitalize the deficit which would result in the BEE party holding onto more debt than equity. 
The SPVs were found to be working under conditions of a bullish stock market performance. 
Being empowered definitely gives the white company a competitive edge over its competitors. 
This is true especially for those companies which do a lot of business with government. It is 
also particularly true for companies which need government permits and licences for them to 
operate. To show the appreciation of this BEE value-add, white companies need to facilitate 
these deals by giving a discount for the value that BEE partners bring to the company and for 
giving the company a competitive advantage7. This will lessen the burden on BEE 
companies, especially when market conditions are difficult. Unfortunately the advantage 
brought about by the BEE partner is in most cases downplayed or denied by these companies. 
Yet in such industries as mining or in industries that rely on government contracts and for 
companies that supply such sectors, the value created by the BEE partners is significant. It 
would be incorrect if such value was not recognised in terms of the transaction. 
Improved BEE Funding Structure 
It has been shown that the SPV structure above is very volatile and presents major risks to a BEE 
company. The government policy of transferring 25% of the economy to black people by 2015 
may end up being wishful thinking. We saw that in some instances 51% announced ended up 
with a NEV of 8.42%. There have been attempts to improve the funding structures in order to 
mitigate risks for both BEE and the established white company. 
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line with current BEE objectives of transferring 25% of businesses and economy to black people. 
This approach does not therefore violate Section 45 of the Income Tax. 
This structure is not subjected to capital gains tax and the tax effects of recoupments. 
The loan that is raised by the NEWCO is tax deductible because it is used to acquire the business 
and not equity. It should be noted that any loan to buy equity is not tax deductible, thereby 
explaining the use of preference shares in our prior example. The tax deductibility of interest 
acts as an incentive for white companies to do BEE deals on the basis of a transfer of assets and 
liabilities. This structure also enhances the BEE credentials of NEWCO because from the first day 
this company will be able to earn all 7 realisation points of Statement 100 of the Scorecard. This 
is so because the BEE Company itself does not have debt. On the contrary the debt is in NEWCO. 
This will therefore give NEWCO an advantage when it bids for new business from the 
government, state owned enterprises and even from the private sector companies who are 
required to be BEE compliant. 
This high leverage of NEWCO may instil management discipline, like in a typical LBO transaction. 
This is so because they want to repay the debt. This will also encourage BEE partners to be more 
involved with the company, again so that the debt should be repaid sooner rather than later. 
This will allow the company to start paying dividends sooner. The downside of this structure is 
that the NEWCO may be constrained to fund future expansion programmes since it has a very 
high gearing ratio. Further loans for expansion may require the white company to take a further 
risk by subordinating future loans. We know that these companies are in most cases reluctant to 
take that risk. This is the same downside we find in LBOs. Further, any economic downturn or 
increases in interest rates may mean that the company is not able to meet its interest 
obligations. Further, the company may be at risk in relation to renewing loans later on and 
management and the BEE partners need to focus on reducing debt levels to reasonable levels as 
is the situation in an LBO. 
These results, particularly in relation to the transfer of equity, are both profound and daunting. 
They are profound because we now know what to expect after the expiry of the term. It thus 
gives all the role players time to rectify some of the glaring problems which may accompany this 
outcome. It is indeed daunting because this may lead to social and political unrest if the intended 
beneficiaries discover what underlines these BEE transactions. No wonder some commentators 











Case Study of BEE Funding Structures 
In this section we intend to look at the funding structure(s) that have been employed in the real BEE 
transactions that have taken place. We would state what the relevant charter is hoping to achieve in 5-10 
years; look what has happened to Net Equity Value so far, and how the picture is likely to pan out when these 
financial structures mature. 
4.1. Metropolitan and Kagiso Trust Investments 
Metropolitan is a leading financial services company and in June 2004 agreed to transfer 10% of the ordinary 
equity in Metropolitan to Kagiso Trust Investments (KTI) which was a leading broad based BEE company. 
The BEE structure set out in our example in Exhibit 5 reflects the BEE financing structure employed by 
Metropolitan to transfer 10% of the equity ownership in the company with some adjustments. 
KTI (via a wholly owned subsidiary) incorporated a private company to be the vehicle to finance the 
transaction. KTI subscribed for the shares in the SPV for a consideration of R30 million. The SPV was 
required to issue redeemable preference shares amounting to R510 million to a consortium of banks. The 
proceeds were used to purchase 75.84 million convertible preference shares issued by Metropolitan at a 
subscription price of R7.12 per share. The preference shares in Metropolitan were convertible on a one for 
one basis after year three and if not converted would be compulsorily redeemable at the end of year five after 
issue. The benefit of this structure would be that the preference dividend lncome stream to the SPV would 
more or less match the preference dividend payable by the SPV to the banks. 
Note that the capital amount achieved can be redeemed by the either partial sale of equity or refinancing of 
the debt, and continuing with preference dividend payment. 
This resulted in a lower level of equity dilution as compared to the immediate subscription for ordinary shares 
in Metropolitan. 
Kagiso further subscribed for 12.7 million convertible preference shares in July 2005 and this was followed by 
a further subscription for 47.1 million shares in December 2005. The shareholding by KTI amounts to about 
17% but this will be subject to dilution when the preference shares are required to be converted. 
If we analyse the first subscription for convertible preference shares, then we estimate that the NEV will be 










R7.12 to R14 during the period as well as the structure avoiding ongoing deficits during the period prior to 
conversion. 
The :,[Idre IJrice performance over 3.5 years represents a growth in market capitalisation of about 21% per 
year. This high growth will have resulted in a favourable effect on NEV but such share price growth is unlikely 
to be sustained over the long term. 
This means that the conclusions reached in our analysis remain valid as we have analysed likely share price 
performance over the long term and its likely effect on BEE equity dilution. The share price performance of 
Metropolitan is unlikely to be sustained in the long term but has been very positive for BEE equity ownership 
in the period under review. 
4.2. ABSA and Batho Bonke Consortium 
In 2004 ABSA concluded a BEE transaction with a Mvelaphanda-Ied consortium. An SPV called Batho Banke 
was formed. The salient features of the deal are: 
• The creation of a new class of share - a redeemable cumulative option - holding preference share 
with par value of R2.00. 
• 73 152 300 redeemable preference shares were issued to Batho Banke with voting rights equal to an 
ordinary ABSA share 
• Holders have the option to subscribe for ABSA shares between 2007 and 2009 
• Preference dividends to be paid at 72% of the prime rate 
• A lock - in provision for 50.1 % of the ABSA ordinary shares arising from the exercise of options until 
31 March 2011 
• Each redeemable preference share allows its holder to subscribe for one ABSA share based on the 30 
day volume weighted average trading price of an ABSA ordinary share: 
• If weighted average share price is < or == R70 then the option strike price == R48; 
• If weighted average share price is > R70,OO and less or equal R100 , then the option strike price will 
be R48,OO plus 70 cents for each complete R1,OO increment in the share price over R70,OO; 
• If the weighted average share price is > RlOO, then the option strike price will be R69,OO 
• The price of ABSA shares was R100,50 as on the th of February, 2008, (Business Report 
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This study has evaluated two case studies in a period of abnormally high equity returns and very low interest 
rates. Yet in the longer term, the examples set out in Chapter 3 indicate how fragile BEE is in a normal equity 
market and in a market subject to higher interest rates. In order to plan for a future equity market which will 
offer returns closer to the long term average and an environment of relatively high interest rates, it is 
imperative that the issues arising from Chapter 3 are examined in relation to the long term effect on BEE 
equity ownership in South Africa. 
Chapter 5 
5.1. Findings, conclusion and policy implications. 
This study has revealed some less than satisfactory outcomes as they relate to the future of BEE and its 
intended policy objectives. There is no doubt that the objectives set by government and corporate South 
Africa are noble and necessary. In this section we therefore summarize what we found and also try and 
understand the implications for the policy objectives. It should be remembered that BEE policy was adopted 
as one of the ways of dealing with apartheid legacy which denied black people access to economic 
opportunities. We make the following findings about the funding structures and their impact on effective 
ownership; 
• There are major similarities and differences between LBOs and BEE funding structures. The major 
similarity is that both LBOs and BEE funding structures are highly leveraged. They both rely on some 
form of debt financing to acquire equity in operational companies. The principal difference is that 
after the transaction, LBOs have more control on management and strategic direction of the 
company, while such control is very much curtailed in the case of BEE structures. 
• This makes the investors to be very vulnerable to the changes in the economic environment. 
Increasing interest rates pose risks to both LBOs and BEE structures. 
• We discovered that in LBOs transactions, interest rates risk and other risks can be mitigated by 
ensuring that you have high quality managers, who in many cases can outperform the equity 
markets. However, BEE investors are in many cases unable to put in their people in companies. It 
continues to be business as usual with no slightest chance of mitigating agency costs and other 
problems. Shareholder agreements which normally are a product of intense negotiations in LBOs are 
imposed on BEE parties. We mentioned above that the power relations between BEE investors and 
white companies tilt in favour of established companies. 
• Therefore in BEE deals the investors are not able to come in with new strategies to mitigate risks 











• Although LBOs are long term investments, the investors there can decide to sell if they are of the 
view that they have maximized returns on their investments. This is not the case with BEE investors. 
They are expected to sign agreements which prevent them from exiting their investments before the 
expiry of a certain period, usually seven to ten years. This has resulted in BEE investors losing a lot 
of value. The ABSA experience with Batho Bonke is a case in point when the share price fell from 
over R140 to R10l. 
• Based on the funding structures that are mostly used, Net Equity Value for BEE investors may end 
up being much lower than what was announced when the transaction was entered into, assuming 
normal equity returns. We saw in an example of GIGA LTD, where a BEE transaction started at 51 % 
but with favourable conditions ended up only transferring 12% of NEV to BEE investors when the 
structure matures after 5 years. This picture deteriorated significantly when economic conditions 
changed. In fact when two variables changed at the same time for worse, probability of bankruptcy 
increased for BEE investors. 
• The ABSA case study was instructive because it showed that despite the Financial Sector Charter 
objective of transferring 10 % effective ownership of Financial assets to black people by 2010, it was 
unusually high equity returns that will result in a NEV of between 6% and 8% when the structure 
matures. 
• The research proves that the objective that government set itself to transfer 25% of the economy by 
2014 to black people will be difficult to achieve, with the current BEE funding structures, and under 
normal economic conditions. This means that with equity market returns of around 14%, and 
interest rates at their current levels, reaching 25% government objective is very difficult. If the 
economic conditions deteriorate, then the target becomes even more difficult to achieve. This will 
put BEE policy and funding structures under severe criticism from the intended beneficiaries. We 
have already seen that the economic melt- down of the late nineties resulted in many BEE failures 
and structures were unwound. 
• We said earlier that failure of BEE policy to deliver on its promises may lead to political instability, 
with negative consequences to established business performance and Foreign Direct Investment. 
Government, private sector, economists and financial practitioners need to re-strategize to avert 
political instability which may create problems akin to those of our neighbour, Zimbabwe. 
• We hope this research will at best stimulate debate timeously to try and avert acrimony and 
instability when these structures do not deliver on their expected outcome. This may cast doubt to 










Annexure A: Empowerdex Rankings and Profitability and Return Ratios 
Company 
~ f-r1,.jlpnl Pharmr'l 
Adcorp Holdings 
3 The Don Group 
4 Oceania Group 
5 Husken Consolidated 
6 Sekunlalo 
7 CadIZ 
8 Bytes technology 
9 Metropolitan 
10 Bldvest Group 
11 Glenrand MIS 
12 Phumelela 
13 Primed" 
14 Trans Hex 
15 Old Mutual Pic 
16 MTN Group 
17 Paracon 




22 Barnard Jacobs Mel 
?3 Nedbank 
24 Business Connexlon 
25 Gold Fields 
26 Exxaro Resources 
Z7 Harmony Gold 
28 Group 5 
29 Aveng 
30 African Rainbow 
31 Sun International 
32 ABSA Group 
33 Mutual & Federal 
34 lasco Electronics 
35 Farltec 
36 Aspen Pharmacare 





42 Alexander Forbes 
43 Santam 
44 Envlroserv 
45 Super Group 
46 Distell Group 
47 Advtech 
48 Foschini 
49 Merale Resources 
50 Distribution & Ware 
51 Comair 
52 SABMiller 
53 Irnpaia Platinum 
54 Coronation Fund 
55 Bllmstone Investment 
56 Mvelaphanda Group 
57 Compu·Clearing Out 
58 Omnia 
59 LewIs Group 
60 AngloGold Ashanti 
61 Growthp0lnt Prop 
62 1 he Spar Group 
63 Africa n Oxygen 
64 Network Healthcare 
65 Investcc 
56 Tiger Brands 
67 Massmart 
68 Kaglso Media 
69 African Bank 
70 BHP Biliiton Pic 
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